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Battered Immigrant Youth Take the Beat: Special 
Immigrant Juveniles Permitted to Age-Out of 
Status 
Emily Rose Gonzalez1 
 
When “S” was only five years old, his father abandoned his family.2 
Soon after, S’s mother began to release her anger towards S’s father on S, 
abusing him both physically and emotionally.3 S’s mother would beat S 
regularly with a cord or rope, leaving his back completely black and blue.4 
Further, S’s mother was verbally abusive, frequently insulting S and even 
threatening to kill him.5 S also believed that his mother encouraged his 
older half brother to abuse him.6 S’s half brother once knocked him 
unconscious by throwing a rock at him, and on another occasion, dumped 
boiling water on S’s legs.7 S finally ran away from home and attempted to 
live with other family members, but they ended up physically abusing him 
as well.8 Ultimately, S managed to make it to the United States (U.S.) where 
he hopes to receive Special Immigrant Juvenile Status (SIJ status). 
Similarly, “T” suffered harsh physical abuse at the hands of her 
stepfather, beginning at the young age of eight.9 Not only did T’s stepfather 
prevent her from leaving the house, seeing her friends, and attending soccer 
practice, but he was also verbally and physically violent.10 When T 
disobeyed her stepfather, he would beat her with a tree branch or a whip, 
leaving cuts and bruises on her back and legs for days.11 Although T’s 
mother knew about the physical and emotional abuse by the stepfather, she 
did nothing to stop it.12 With no other family in her home country, T 
ventured to the U.S.13 She too hopes to receive SIJ status. 
“R,” a fifteen-year-old Honduran, was also fortunate enough to escape 
the extreme physical abuse he suffered at the hands of his stepfather.14 R’s 
stepfather beat him severely with rods, pieces of wood, and a machete 
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handle; he also burned him with hot objects.15 R managed to flee to the U.S. 
to seek a safe haven, but instead found himself placed in a detention center 
by Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE).16 
Congress created SIJ status so that legal citizenship could be obtained by 
abandoned, abused, or neglected children. Yet, even though they are 
eligible, countless children are unable to obtain this status due to an “age-
out” predicament. Even if these children are able to apply for SIJ status, 
getting that status can take years, and sometimes the applications fail 
because processing time has run out.17 Applications for SIJ status are lost, 
some multiple times.18 At least one attorney has testified to a culture of “no” 
and passiveness towards SIJ applications. The attorney asserts that at the 
Department of Homeland Security Immigration Services she was “told by a 
supervisor she wouldn’t want anybody to take the risk of approving [an SIJ 
status application] and risk getting fired.”19 Furthermore, although the lack 
of aging-out protection undermines the purpose and intent of the SIJ statute, 
a federal district court recently ruled that the Department of Homeland 
Security’s (DHS) lack of an age-out regulation is permissible.20  
Section I examines the SIJ statute, its history, and the requirements for 
SIJ status eligibility. It also addresses the age-out phenomenon and the 
repercussions of aging-out for SIJs. This section also deals with the DHS’s 
unaccountability and delay in allowing SIJs to age-out of the status that has 
been specially provided for them by Congress. Currently, no policy or 
legislation exists to compel DHS or state courts to look into SIJ eligibility.21 
The section proceeds with a discussion on the differing age requirements for 
states’ foster care eligibility. It then concludes with a focus on the aftermath 
of SIJs aging-out and why these children should be given the utmost 
opportunity to receive the status Congress has specifically reserved for 
them.  
Section II examines the recent district court case Perez-Olano v. 
Gonzalez, where the court held that SIJs can age-out of status. This section 
argues that Perez-Olano was wrongly decided and that, in interpreting the 
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ultimate purpose of the SIJ statute, the court erroneously interpreted that 
purpose. 
Section III is an examination of legal conventions that provide support 
for an SIJ’s inability to age-out. It argues that the Child Status Protection 
Act should include SIJs in its list of immigrant children that it prevents from 
aging-out of legal citizenship opportunities. The section further holds that 
SIJs, like unaccompanied child asylum-seekers, should be prevented from 
aging-out because of the two groups’ striking similarities. Next, the section 
demonstrates how SIJs can fulfill all the elements necessary for asylum 
eligibility. Section III then addresses the shamed reality that the U.S. is not 
a signatory to the Convention on the Rights of the Child; however, if it 
were, these youths would be prevented from aging-out in order to bring the 
statute into accordance with the Convention. Section IV argues that, like 
other countries, the U.S. should acknowledge that children have special 
needs; as such, children should be afforded a right to legal representation. 
Last, Section V provides recommendations for relieving the SIJ age-out 
problem and answers why such changes are necessary. To remedy the 
problems surrounding the aging-out of potential SIJs, the SIJ statute needs 
to be amended to prevent these children from aging-out, and the Perez-
Olano case must be challenged and overturned. Allowing an applicant to 
age-out of SIJ status eligibility is not only wrong because these applicants 
are some of the most vulnerable and deserving undocumented immigrants 
in the U.S., but also because this circumstance is inconsistent with other 
U.S. immigration policies and international law. In addition to revision of 
the SIJ statute and the Perez-Olano decision, SIJ applicants should be 
appointed representation in order to protect their interests and ensure the 
timely execution of their applications. SIJ applications should be expedited 
and not placed in the control of immigration officers, many of whom focus 
on deportation. Lastly, the U.S. should treat SIJ applicants as 
unaccompanied asylum-seekers in order to afford these minors the same 
age-out protection and international recognition as other asylees. 
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I. SPECIAL IMMIGRANT JUVENILE STATUS 
In 1990, Congress added the SIJ status provision to the Immigration and 
Nationality Act (INA), codified at 101(a)(27)(J) and 8 U.S.C. § 
1101(a)(27)(J).22 The SIJ statute provides a means to obtain legal 
citizenship status for some of the most vulnerable and deserving 
undocumented immigrants in the U.S.––children abandoned, abused, or 
neglected by their own families.23 In 2007, an estimated 1.6 million SIJs 
(i.e., immigrant children eligible for SIJ status) lived in the U.S., with “at 
least 110,000 in New York State alone.”24 However, as of 2008, 
approximately 500 SIJ status applications for permanent residency have 
been adjudicated by the DHS’s U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services 
(USCIS).25 
It is imperative that these children’s applications are expedited and heard 
immediately, and that they receive SIJ status as soon as possible. Without 
legal status, these children lack rights and benefits. While these children are 
on the streets or in the underground world of undocumented immigrants, 
they are ineligible for public benefits such as medical care and student 
loans.26 SIJ applicants also cannot legally apply for employment, and it is 
nearly impossible for them to legally pursue an education beyond high 
school.27 Despite the large group of children that come to the U.S. seeking 
refuge from their abusive past and the beginning of a better life, SIJ status 
remains relatively unknown, seemingly complex, and underutilized.28 Given 
these circumstances, this article focuses on advocating that an SIJ should 
not be allowed to age-out of eligibility if his or her application were 
submitted when the age requirement was fulfilled (i.e., while the SIJ was 
under the age of eighteen or twenty-one, depending on applicable state law). 
Statutory protections need to be put in place to prevent this occurrence. 
A. Special Immigrant Juvenile Eligibility 
To be eligible for SIJ status, the child must meet the following criteria: 
(1) the child must be under the jurisdiction of the juvenile court or the 
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probate and family court due to family abuse, neglect, or abandonment; (2) 
the child must be “deemed eligible for long-term foster care,” meaning the 
child cannot be reunified with his or her family because of past abuse, 
neglect, or abandonment, and that reunification efforts have ceased; (3) the 
court must determine that it is not in the child’s best interest to return to the 
child’s home country; and (4) the court must issue a signed order stating 
that the child meets the above criteria for SIJ status.29 Further, the child 
must also meet the requirements for lawful permanent residence (LPR) 
status.30 As such, the child must not have a criminal conviction, a history of 
drug use or prostitution, HIV/AIDS or other certain physical or mental 
conditions, or other immigration violations. If any of these conditions are 
present, the SIJ application may be denied.31 
Additionally, as there is a unique administrative mechanism set by 
Congress, SIJ applicants must go through multiple courts. The process 
requires the cooperation of state and local child welfare systems, state 
juvenile courts, and ICE.32 To apply for SIJ status, children must go through 
both ICE and the state juvenile dependency system.33 The law gives state 
courts the power to determine the minor’s needs and requires that ICE rely 
on the state juvenile or family court’s findings.34 Afterward, ICE determines 
the child’s eligibility based upon the state court’s finding.35 One author 
notes that, given these entangled responsibilities without clear roles for ICE 
and state courts, Congress has set the stage for conflict between federal and 
state governments.36 This tension adds to ongoing disputes between federal 
and state agencies. For example, normally, ICE has the primary 
responsibility for verifying and determining the underlying facts supporting 
an immigrant’s petition for relief.37 However, under the SIJ statute, ICE 
must defer to the findings of the state court, and ICE has no authority to 
review the state court’s determinations.38 This complicated network places a 
great burden on the children and their legal representatives, and causes 
additional time and delay in the application process. 
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B. The “Age-Out” Predicament 
Due to the workings, intricacies, and other problems with the SIJ statute, 
countless children in the child welfare system ultimately “age-out” of 
eligibility for SIJ status. There are a broad range of reasons why children 
age-out: lack of legal representation; nonrecognition by legal authorities of 
a child’s eligibility early on; a child’s unawareness of the availability of SIJ 
status; or aging-out of a child while his or her application is pending.39 
Many children age-out of the family court and foster care systems before 
anyone recognizes their eligibility for SIJ status.40 Routinely, neither agency 
caseworkers, legal guardians, nor judges determine the legal status of these 
children upon first contact with them.41 Moreover, there is no legislation 
that requires foster care services to make these inquiries, even though they 
are responsible for caring for these children. 
Even more troubling, SIJs are allowed to age-out of their eligibility 
because there is nothing in the current SIJ statute that obligates the courts to 
expedite or hear SIJ cases before the children age-out. First, in order to be 
statutorily eligible for SIJ status the child must be dependent on a state court 
at the time the SIJ petition or SIJ-based adjustment of status application is 
decided. Hence, USCIS will automatically revoke that status when the 
youth ceases to be a dependent of the state.42 Generally, state courts 
terminate jurisdiction when the child reaches eighteen or nineteen-years of 
age (a few states care for children up to the age of twenty-one), depending 
on the age limit of child dependency for that particular state. If USCIS 
refuses to adjudicate a statutorily-eligible youth’s petition by the time the 
dependency order terminates, the minor ages-out of the benefit.43 
Furthermore, in order for the immigration judge to adjudicate the SIJ’s 
application, DHS must complete a security investigation on the child; 
however, this often takes months, leaving children to age-out in the 
meantime.44 Hence, by merely holding onto an application, an immigration 
officer can easily defeat a child’s claim for SIJ status, as nothing in the SIJ 
statute requires that an application be adjudicated before the applicant ages-
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out.45 Even if not done intentionally, this phenomenon happens time and 
time again due to the backlogged and increasingly over-loaded immigration 
courts.46 
Many advocates have attempted to bring the age-out problem to the 
forefront of Congress’s and the courts’ attention; however, they have failed 
to receive a favorable response. For example, the Columbia Law School 
Child Advocacy Clinic sent a letter to U.S. House Representative Jerrold 
Nadler, urging him to advocate the ending of aging-out of SIJ status.47 The 
Clinic pointed out to Nadler that it is often difficult to identify a young 
person as undocumented, or to obtain documents necessary to apply for SIJ 
status before aging-out.48 Additionally, the Immigration Prof Blog has 
called for advocates who know of children in danger of aging-out to join 
together to call this problem to the attention of the federal courts (this 
summons ultimately led to the recent case Perez-Olano v. Gonzalez, 
subsequently discussed).49 
Opponents to the proposition of allowing an SIJ’s age to toll (i.e., stop 
the child’s age at the time the application is filed) argue that the SIJ statute 
does not provide for “infinite eligibility.”50 Rather, the SIJ statute allows for 
SIJs to age-out.51 These opponents argue that this position is supported by 
legislative history; in 1993, the age-out regulations were enacted, and when 
Congress amended the statute in 1997 it did not disturb the age-out 
regulations.52 Further, the regulations hold that this status is for juveniles 
that are dependent on the juvenile court and the state; once such dependency 
is terminated, these juveniles are no longer deserving of the status.53 
However, due to the suffering and dire consequences these youths face if 
they age-out of this status, the SIJ statute’s age-out requirement needs to be 
reformed to allow an applicant’s age to toll instead of aging-out of the 
program. The court has misinterpreted the statute and has ignored the 
crucial purpose of the statute as clearly intended by Congress. Numerous 
other INA provisions allow a child’s age to toll, thus preventing the child 
from aging-out. However, SIJs were excluded from the Child Status 
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Protection Act’s list of immigrant youths that are protected from aging-out, 
even though SIJs are some of the most vulnerable and deserving immigrant 
youths in the U.S. The ability of the USCIS to merely delay a juvenile 
immigrant’s application until the juvenile has exceeded the age limit is 
unacceptable. The SIJ statute needs to be interpreted differently because, as 
it currently stands, the USCIS has discretion to hold onto the juvenile’s 
petition until the juvenile ages-out of eligibility, causing extreme hardship 
and jeopardizing the lives of these “specially protected” juveniles. 
C. State-to-State Foster Care Age Requirements 
Some SIJs age-out of foster care sooner than other SIJs because states 
vary as to when children age-out of foster care or state dependency. In some 
states, children age-out of foster care at eighteen and in others, at twenty-
one. For example, in Florida, a state with one of the nation’s largest 
immigrant populations, state law defines a child as, “any unmarried person 
under the age of 18 . . . alleged to be dependent, in need of services, or from 
a family in need of services.”54 On the other hand, in the mid-1980s, New 
York (also with a large immigrant population) raised its foster care age limit 
to twenty-one in response to advocates’ calling for a higher age.55 New 
York is just one in a handful of states that maintains responsibility for 
children in foster care until the age of twenty-one.56 
This variance in state law is critical to SIJs, as they are only eligible for 
status under the current law as long as they are a dependent of the state.57 
Hence, some youths will age-out sooner than others and therefore lose their 
eligibility sooner. Thus, it is even more important for SIJs living in states 
where the age limit is eighteen for SIJ-status eligibility, to begin their 
application process as soon as possible, and therefore be protected from 
aging-out. This inconsistency and geographically-determined unequal 
treatment represents one more reason why the SIJ program should not 
adhere to a strict requirement for state dependency, and instead should 
allow for tolling once a qualified applicant submits his or her application. 
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D. The Aftermath of Aging-out 
Without legal status to be in the U.S., an SIJ cannot receive public 
benefits, such as medical care, student loans, welfare, or other financial 
benefits.58 Furthermore, these youths cannot legally apply for a job.59 
Without protection from aging-out, potential SIJs will find themselves 
members of two at-risk social groups: undocumented immigrants living in 
the U.S. and unsupported ex-foster care recipients. 
Youths aging-out of foster care often find themselves worse off than 
before. Many advocates are pushing all states to raise their foster care age 
limits to twenty-one because most eighteen-year-olds are still not ready or 
able to be self-sufficient.60 Currently, an estimated twenty thousand children 
age-out of foster care every year;61 within two to four years of aging-out, 25 
percent are homeless, 40 percent are on public assistance, and 50 percent 
are unemployed.62 Furthermore, about 25 percent of all aged-out males will 
have been incarcerated and more than 50 percent of all females will have a 
child.63 For example, in the state of Vermont, the Department of 
Corrections’s records show that the fastest growing group of inmates is that 
between the ages of eighteen and twenty-one. Additionally, children 
previously in state custody have a disproportionately higher rate of 
substance abuse, premature pregnancy, and mental health issues than the 
rest of the general state population.64 One study, the Midwest Evaluation of 
the Adult Functioning of Former Foster Youth, shows that 90 percent of 
employed aged-out foster youths were making less than $10,000 per year.65 
It is important to give potential SIJs a greater opportunity to gain 
citizenship status. Overcoming barriers already faced by aged-out foster 
youths is hard enough. However, the struggle to sustain and better one’s life 
without citizenship, living in the underground world that many non-status 
immigrants are forced to live in, is much more difficult. Furthermore, by 
granting potential SIJs a fair chance at status rather than allowing them to 
age-out as the result of administrative delays, Congress would create an 
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opportunity for those children to better their lives by attending college and 
gaining legal employment. 
II. PEREZ-OLANO V. GONZALEZ 
The U.S. District Court’s January 2008 decision in Perez-Olano v. 
Gonzalez destroys the opportunity for some SIJs to seek refuge in the U.S. 
In Perez-Olano, the court upheld the age-out provision of the SIJ statute.66 
The plaintiffs were immigrant youths who had “been denied specific 
consent to state court jurisdiction for [an] SIJ-predicate order, denied SIJ 
status or SIJ-based adjustment of status pursuant to the ‘age-out 
regulations,’ and/or were unable to apply for SIJ status or SIJ-based 
adjustment of status pursuant to the removal regulations.”67 
The plaintiffs brought a class action suit challenging government 
policies, practices, and regulations with respect to the SIJ provisions of the 
INA.68 The plaintiffs made three main allegations against the government. 
First, the plaintiffs challenged the regulation enacted by the Attorney 
General which enables an SIJ applicant to age-out of eligibility if the child 
turns twenty-one-years-old before being granted SIJ status or SIJ-based 
adjustment of status, or if the child is no longer a dependent on the state 
court or no longer eligible for long-term foster care.69 Second, the plaintiffs 
challenged the government’s policy requiring in-custody minors to obtain 
ICE’s specific consent for an SIJ-predicate order, on the grounds that such 
orders do not “determine the custody status or placement” of an in-custody 
minor.70 Third, the plaintiffs challenged several regulations that apply to 
SIJs in removal proceedings, arguing that the regulations unlawfully deny 
SIJs adjudication of their adjustment of status applications.71 As to the three 
challenges, the court granted the plaintiff’s motion in part and denied it in 
part.72 Although the court ruled in the youths’ favor as to the specific 
consent claim, the court denied the other two claims, upholding the current 
age-out provision.73 
Battered Immigrant Youth Take the Beat 419 
VOLUME 8 • ISSUE 1 • 2009 
In order to determine whether the youths could bring a class action, the 
plaintiffs had to meet the requirements of Rule 23 of the Federal Rules of 
Civil Procedure.74 In legal parlance, class representation exists upon a 
showing of numerosity, commonality, typicality, or adequacy, 
respectively.75  
Here, the plaintiffs proposed three subclasses for each of the three claims 
brought. One such subclass was the “age-out subclass.”76 The plaintiffs 
identified the “age-out subclass” as “youth[s] whose petitions for SIJ 
classification [d]efendants deny or revoke pursuant to 8 C.F.R. §§ 
204.11(c)(1) or (5), or 205.1(a)(3)(iv)(A), (C), or (D).”77 
In trying to achieve class certification, the plaintiffs in Perez-Olano 
simultaneously demonstrated why SIJs were in need of legal protection due 
to their disadvantaged circumstances and the obstacles they faced due to 
delay by DHS. First, as to the “numerosity” requirement for the age-out 
subclass, the plaintiffs argued that the size of the subclass was uncertain 
because the government does not maintain records of the number of persons 
that submit SIJ applications and those applications are subsequently denied 
or left undecided once the applicant ages-out.78 The defendants provided 
support for this contention by declaring that the government has “not 
tracked the number of persons denied SIJ classification or SIJ-based 
adjustment of status due to the age-out regulations.”79 However, the 
plaintiffs did make an approximation based upon the government’s estimate 
of 2,258 SIJ applications filed between 2000 and 2006.80 The plaintiffs 
proffered that approximately 375 SIJ applications are filed annually.81 The 
plaintiffs also noted that in 1990, the majority of detained immigrant 
juveniles were sixteen- or seventeen-years-old, and hence a majority of 
these applicants were on the verge of aging-out from SIJ eligibility.82 
The plaintiffs also offered declarations of immigration attorneys to 
support their argument. The declarations represented that there were long 
delays in the adjudication of SIJ applications and that there were many 
instances of SIJ-eligible youths losing eligibility due to the age-out 
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regulations.83 In addition, the plaintiffs provided testimony from attorneys 
that had worked with immigrant children, many of whom had sought SIJ 
classification and adjustment of status subject to the age-out regulations. 
Based on the approximate statistics and information from immigration 
attorneys, the plaintiffs maintained that hundreds of abused, abandoned, and 
neglected youths are subject to the age-out regulations.84 On the weight of 
this evidence, the court found that the numerosity element was satisfied. 
To satisfy the “commonality” requirement of Rule 23, the plaintiffs 
argued that common legal issues united the age-out subclass.85 The 
plaintiffs alleged that the defendants had promulgated and adhered to age-
out regulations which are inconsistent with the SIJ statute.86 Additionally, 
the youths claimed that the defendants unreasonably delayed decisions on 
SIJ and SIJ-based adjustment of status applications, causing class members 
to age-out from eligibility.87 The court ultimately held that the youths’ 
claims established commonality as the group presented common legal 
issues independent of class members’ factual differences.88 
Under the “typicality” requirement, the plaintiffs claimed that the 
defendants had adopted policies violating the INA by requiring specific 
consent if the state court did not alter “custody status or placement.”89 The 
plaintiffs further alleged that the defendants had a common policy of 
delaying adjudication of SIJ applications until the youths age-out of 
eligibility, creating a typicality of the class.90 The plaintiffs also alleged that 
class members shared a specific injury—loss of SIJ eligibility.91 
The court found that the plaintiff youths would adequately represent the 
age-out subclass because they challenged the defendant’s authority to enact 
and implement the age-out regulations, and the application of those 
regulations.92 Additionally, the class members were similarly situated in 
their claims, as all had lost their SIJ or SIJ-based adjustment of status 
eligibility.93 Ultimately, the court held that the age-out regulations are 
“generally applicable to the class,” and as their claims challenge common 
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policies or practices and seek generally applicable injunctive relief, the 
group satisfied the requirements of Rule 23.94 
The plaintiffs also challenged several age-out regulations.95 First, the 
group challenged 8 C.F.R. § 204.11(c)(1), which precludes SIJ 
classification once a youth is no longer “under twenty-one years of age.”96 
This provision expressly provides, “[a]n alien is eligible for classification as 
a special immigrant under section 101(a)(27)(J) of the Act if the alien [i]s 
under twenty-one years of age.”97 Additionally, the plaintiffs challenged 
legislative code 8 C.F.R. § 204.11(c)(5), which requires that a youth 
seeking SIJ status “[c]ontinues to be dependent upon the juvenile court and 
eligible for long-term foster care, such declaration, dependency or eligibility 
not having been vacated, terminated, or otherwise ended.”98 The plaintiffs 
similarly challenged the age-out regulation for SIJ-based adjustment of 
status, 8 C.F.R. §§ 205.1(a)(3)(iv)(A), (C), and (D), which revokes a 
juvenile’s SIJ classification “[u]pon the beneficiary reaching the age of 21; . 
. . the termination of the beneficiary’s dependency upon the juvenile court; . 
. . [or] the termination of the [youth’s] eligibility for long-term foster 
care.”99 
To determine the plaintiffs’ claims as to the age-out regulations, the court 
applied the deference standard derived from Chevron v. Natural Resources 
Defense Council.100 Under Chevron, the Supreme Court adopted a two-step 
test for judicial review of administrative agency regulations that interpret 
federal statutes. The first step is to consider whether Congress spoke 
directly in the statute to the particular issue: “If the intent of Congress is 
clear, that is the end of the matter; for the court, as well as the agency, must 
give effect to the unambiguously expressed intent of Congress.”101 
However, where the statute is ambiguous or silent with respect to the issue, 
a court proceeds to the second step. The court must then determine 
“whether the agency’s answer is based on a permissible construction of the 
statute.”102 An agency’s interpretation of a regulation is permissible unless 
that interpretation is “arbitrary, capricious, or manifestly contrary to the 
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statute.”103 After the SIJ statute’s enactment in 1990, the Attorney General 
adopted the age-out regulations under their authority to establish regulations 
governing administration of the immigration system.104 Thus, the court’s 
analysis of the application of the age-out regulations proceeded under this 
general grant of regulatory authority. 105 
A. Why Perez-Olano Was Wrongfully Decided 
Under the Chevron test, “[c]ongressional intent may be determined by 
‘traditional tools of statutory construction,’ and if a court using these tools 
ascertains that Congress had a clear intent on the question at issue, that 
intent must be given effect as law.”106 The traditional tools of statutory 
construction are: (1) a review of the whole context of the statutory 
language; (2) a common sense reading of the whole statute; (3) a 
consideration of prior interpretation; and (4) a reading of applicable 
legislative history.107 Hence, the court in Perez-Olano first looked to the 
text of the SIJ statute. The statute provides eligibility to a child:  
[W]ho has been declared dependent on a juvenile court . . . has been 
deemed eligible by that court for long-term foster care due to abuse, 
neglect, or abandonment . . . [and when it] has been determined . . . 
that it would not be in the alien’s best interest to be returned to [their 
home country].108  
The plaintiffs stressed that the statute is written in the past-perfect tense, 
a grammatical construction indicating that SIJ eligibility is not conditional 
on either a child’s age, continued dependency on a juvenile court, or 
continued eligibility for long-term foster care.109 Since the past-perfect tense 
is used to show which of several events happens first, this grammatical 
choice was of particular significance in interpreting the statute as written. 
According to the plaintiffs, the juvenile’s eligibility is established once an 
SIJ predicate order is granted, and the defendants must then decide whether 
to grant SIJ status;110 thus, the plaintiffs argued that any regulations 
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imposing additional eligibility requirements, such as continued eligibility 
for long-term foster care, were unauthorized by the statute.111 
The plaintiffs also argued that they were protected by the Due Process 
Clause of the U.S. Constitution, which incorporates the guarantees of equal 
protection.112 The plaintiffs maintained that because states differ with 
respect to the age limit for state dependency (eighteen or twenty-one), it 
would be a denial of equal protection for the court to condition SIJ 
eligibility on continuing dependency.113 The plaintiffs argued that this 
would allow some SIJs to receive eligibility if they resided in a state with a 
broader dependency statute (permitting state dependency until age twenty-
one) while denying other SIJs eligibility if they live in a state with a 
narrower statute (dependency until eighteen).114 
On the other hand, the defendants responded that the SIJ statute does not 
provide for “infinite eligibility.”115 Rather, the statute only speaks to the 
criterion that establishes SIJ eligibility, not the duration of that eligibility.116 
Further, the defendants emphasized that it was within the Attorney 
General’s delegated authority to grant SIJ status based on an SIJ predicate 
order.117 This is due to the fact that the Attorney General must expressly 
consent to the dependency order which serves as a precondition for granting 
SIJ status. Thus, according to the defendants, the SIJ statute permitted age-
out regulations.118 
In its ruling, the court began by looking to the express text of the 
statute.119 The court agreed that the text of the statute provides for a child’s 
SIJ eligibility once a state court makes the requisite findings in a SIJ 
predicate order.120 However, the court reasoned that, although Congress 
defined eligibility in terms of past state court findings, the statute did not 
speak directly to the issue of aging-out.121 Thus, because Congress’s intent 
with respect to the age-out issue was not addressed explicitly in the statute, 
the court next looked to congressional intent, as reflected in the history and 
purpose of the statutory scheme.122 
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As evidenced by materials discussed in the next section, the purpose of 
the SIJ statute is to protect abused, neglected, and abandoned immigrant 
youths by providing a method for adjustment to lawful permanent resident 
status. However, the court noted that Congress had not consistently 
followed this goal in relation to the age-out regulations. The pertinent age-
out regulations were enacted in 1993, a few years after the passage of the 
SIJ statute.123 In 1997, when Congress amended the SIJ statute, it did not 
disturb the age-out regulations.124 Additionally, the court observed that in 
2002, when Congress passed the Child Status Protection Act, it chose to 
exclude SIJ applicants from the list of juveniles that would be prevented 
from aging-out.125 Thus, the court viewed this history as evidence that 
Congress condoned the age-out regulations with respect to SIJ eligibility.126 
Under Chevron, when Congress does not speak directly on an issue and 
has delegated rulemaking authority to an agency, the court will consider 
whether the agency interpretation is based upon a permissible construction 
of the statute.127 If such interpretation is reasonable, the agency 
interpretation will not be disturbed. Again, the purpose of the SIJ statute is 
to protect immigrant children from abuse, neglect, and abandonment. Based 
on that purpose, the court held that it is reasonable for the Board of 
Immigration Appeals (BIA) to limit eligibility for SIJ status or SIJ-based 
adjustment of status to immigrant children, as opposed to older adolescents 
or individuals who are no longer dependent on the state.128 Thus, the court 
held that the BIA’s interpretation of the SIJ statute is consistent with 
Congress’s goal. Hence, the age-out regulations were not held to be 
arbitrary and capricious.129 The court ultimately reasoned that because the 
defendants had authority to adopt the age-out regulations, and because the 
regulation expressly declares that SIJs must be in continued legal custody of 
the state or state agency, the regulations had a reasonable basis and were 
therefore permissible under Chevron.130 However, the court did maintain 
that the youths still had a right to raise claims that the defendants 
unreasonably delayed adjudication of SIJ applications.131 
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B. How Perez-Olano Should Have Been Decided 
Using traditional tools of statutory construction, the court arrived at an 
erroneous conclusion as to the validity of the age-out regulations of the SIJ 
statute. The court misinterpreted the primary purpose of the statute, which is 
to protect abused, abandoned, and neglected children. The court ignored the 
fact that when these youths age-out, they still face the same struggles as 
they did when they applied for SIJ status. 
Looking to the congressional intent from the history and purpose of the 
statutory scheme, it is more likely that Congress did not intend for these 
youths to age-out of SIJ status.132 However, instead of focusing on the need 
to protect these immigrant abuse victims, the court in Perez-Olano 
interpreted the statute as only intending to help children. If the court had 
recognized the primary purpose to be protection, the BIA’s interpretation 
would have been seen as irrational and unreasonable. Thus, the court’s 
interpretation does not adhere to the second prong of Chevron, as aging-out 
puts these children in the same place they would have been without SIJ 
status. How would a statute, intended to protect abandoned, abused, and 
neglected immigrant youths, serve its purpose if the intended beneficiaries 
are refused such status while their applications are pending? These youths 
are automatically denied eligibility merely because of timing and 
bureaucracy, although they continue to be in the same state of need as they 
were the day before their eighteenth birthdays. Although perhaps not clearly 
erroneous, such an evaluation takes the focus off the actual purpose of 
protection. It is incorrect to examine the purpose of a statute by primarily 
focusing on what age is to be protected without looking first to the more 
obvious and objective purpose. 
In practical terms, it is an unreasonable interpretation of the SIJ statute to 
allow these youths to age-out of protection when their applications are 
pending, as they still face the same strife as when they applied for SIJ 
status. Without SIJ status, these immigrant youth fall into the shadows of 
American society and are forced to live life in the underground world of 
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undocumented immigrants. After aging-out, these children who sought 
refuge in the U.S. are denied opportunities to acquire higher education, are 
unable to get jobs due to lack of status, and will not qualify for government 
support. In conclusion, the court in Perez-Olano, upon its own statutory 
interpretation, erroneously emphasized “children” when determining the 
purpose of the SIJ statute; instead, the court should have emphasized the 
word “protect” when determining the purpose of the statute. 
III. OTHER STATUTES AND TREATIES SUPPORTING A DIFFERENT 
INTERPRETATION OF THE SIJ STATUTE 
A. The Child Status Protection Act 
Congress passed the Child Status Protection Act (CSPA) in August 2002 
after recognizing the age-out predicament faced by immigrant youths 
caused by administrative processing time. The CSPA allows certain non-
citizens to retain classification as a “child” under the INA, even if he or she 
reaches the age of twenty-one. Thus, these children will never age-out of 
status.133 The CSPA protects (a) direct beneficiaries of family-based 
immigration petitions and (b) derivative beneficiaries in family-based, 
employment-based, and diversity visa categories.134 Sections two and three 
of the CSPA address the aging-out problems for the sons and daughters of 
U.S. citizens and the children of lawful permanent residents. The CSPA 
freezes the beneficiary’s age on the date that his or her visa petition is 
filed.135 In other words, the beneficiary will be treated as a “child” as long 
as he or she is under age twenty-one at the time the petition is filed with 
USCIS. Further, derivative children—those applying for status through 
another person from a family-based, employment-based, or diversity visa 
petition—retain their derivative status even after turning twenty-one.136 
Similarly, children who were under the age of twenty-one at the time their 
parents filed an application for asylum, for refugee status, or for relief under 
the Violence Against Women Act (VAWA) are accorded status even if they 
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are over twenty-one at the time their applications are approved.137 However, 
not only did Congress not include a provision that eliminates SIJs from 
aging-out, but Congress did not include SIJs in the list of children protected 
by the CSPA. 
Congress should have either included a provision in the SIJ statute or 
provided protection for SIJs in the CSPA. Through the CSPA, Congress has 
recognized that certain children should not age-out of the protections of 
various statutes; Congress should also recognize that SIJs should be 
protected from aging-out. Through the passage of the CSPA, Congress 
acknowledged the injustice of allowing children to age-out while their 
applications are being processed. SIJs are just as deserving, if not more 
deserving, than the children protected in the CSPA. The children protected 
by the CSPA are those who have the family support in the U.S. By contrast, 
SIJs are children who lack parental guidance and support and who have 
come to the U.S. alone in search of safety or a better life. 
The fact that SIJs do not have family in the U.S. should help, rather than 
hinder them, in seeking legal status. Without parental support, these 
children can only rely on themselves, their friends, and the U.S. government 
for help. Moreover, the fact that SIJs do not have parents or family in the 
U.S. should provide an even stronger reason for Congress to assist these 
children. SIJs deserve more protection through state foster care; however, 
this system is ill-equipped and unwilling to petition for each SIJ. 
Furthermore, as subsequently discussed, SIJs face similar struggles as 
children seeking asylum and refuge. Since children seeking asylum and 
refugee status are protected by the CSPA, SIJs should also be protected by 
the CSPA. SIJs face the same (if not more) devastating problems as asylum-
seekers. As Congress has routinely recognized through the CSPA and its 
asylum and refugee programs, juvenile immigrant applicants deserve to be 
protected from aging-out. For all of the aforementioned reasons, Congress 
should recognize that SIJs should also be protected from aging-out. 
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Moreover, the CSPA protects children filing for VAWA relief as 
immediate relatives of other VAWA applicants.138 Passed in 2000, VAWA 
created a “U visa” for people that have suffered substantial physical or 
mental abuse as a result of several enumerated acts of violence, including 
torture, trafficking, domestic violence, sexual assault, and felonious 
assault.139 SIJs should qualify as beneficiaries of this visa, since they are the 
direct, first-hand victims of domestic violence. SIJs have been shunned, 
abused both physically and mentally, and neglected by their own parents—
the people that were supposed to protect and provide for them. As the 
CSPA protects children who are victims (or even derivative victims) of 
domestic violence and abuse under VAWA, so too, should SIJs be protected 
by the CSPA. Therefore, as Congress has recognized through the CSPA that 
certain children should not age-out of protection through various statutes, 
Congress should also recognize that SIJs should be protected from aging-
out. 
B. Asylum-seekers 
The distinction between unaccompanied child asylum-seekers and SIJs is 
minimal, and both should be afforded similar protections, including the 
inability to age-out once a proper application is submitted. The United 
Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) Guidelines on the 
Protection and Care of Refugee Children and the Guidelines on Policies and 
Procedures in Dealing with Unaccompanied Minors has defined an 
unaccompanied minor as an individual “who is separated from both parents 
and is not being cared for by an adult who by law or custom has 
responsibility to do so.”140 Furthermore, U.S. guidelines define an 
unaccompanied minor as a child “under the age of 18 who seek[s] 
admission to the U.S. and who [is] not accompanied by a parent or 
guardian.”141 It has been estimated that in the U.S., approximately 70 
percent of children apprehended by ICE fall under this definition of an 
unaccompanied minor.142 It is estimated that about 4,700 unaccompanied 
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minors are detained annually by ICE.143 Most significantly, when an 
unaccompanied minor reaches the age of adulthood (eighteen) before a 
decision is reached on his application for asylum or while waiting for a 
decision from an appeal of a denial of status, the child continues to be 
treated as a minor.144 This is because the focus is placed on the child’s 
circumstances and age at the time of entry, rather than the child’s 
circumstances and age while awaiting the processing of his or her 
application.145 Therefore, an unaccompanied child seeking asylum will 
never age-out of eligibility. 
How can the U.S. justify making unaccompanied child asylum-seekers 
unable to age-out while refusing this privilege to SIJs? This question is 
especially puzzling because SIJs can also fulfill all the requisite 
requirements for asylum. In order to be granted asylum, an applicant must 
establish that he or she is a person “who is unable or unwilling to return to, 
and unable or unwilling to avail himself or herself of the protection of” his 
or her nationality “because of persecution or a well-founded fear of 
persecution on account of race, religion, nationality, membership in a 
particular social group, or political opinion.”146 This means that the child 
must show he or she was persecuted in the past or has a well-founded fear 
of being persecuted in the future, and that the persecution is based on one of 
the five enumerated grounds.147 
C. The Family as a Particular Social Group 
The element of “particular social group,” although difficult to satisfy, has 
been found fulfilled in the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals in Aguirre-
Cervantes v. INS.148 In that case, the court held for the first time that 
“victims of domestic violence may seek asylum based on their abuse at 
home because the family forms a protected ‘social group’ under the U.S. 
asylum law.”149 The court held that an immediate family whose members all 
live together and are subject to severe abuse by a family member could be 
recognized as a “protected particular social group.”150 To this end, the court 
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also maintained that the asylum-seeker must show that the persecuting 
family member is a person that the government is unable or unwilling to 
control, and that the government often overlooks domestic violence 
situations.151 Hence, under very specific circumstances, this element might 
be met in a child asylum case. 
D. Abandonment, Abuse, or Neglect as Persecution 
Abandonment, abuse, or neglect of a child rises to the level of 
persecution. The Convention on the Rights of the Child (CRC) 
(subsequently discussed) holds that, specific to children, persecution can 
arise more readily because of the child’s heightened dependence and need 
for assistance and protection.152 Additionally, article seven of the 
Convention establishes parental care as a basic human right of a child.153 
Thus, children who are abandoned, abused, or neglected by their parents or 
families may be considered persecuted because they are either unwanted or 
the family is unable to provide for them, and the state fails to provide 
adequate surrogate protection.154 Further, the denial of a child’s basic social 
and economic rights—the opportunity to attend school, access to health 
care, food, and housing—has been recognized by the international 
community through the CRC as a violation which may rise to the level of 
persecution.155 
E. The Parent as the Agent of Harm 
To fulfill the elements of asylum, the child must demonstrate that the 
experienced or feared persecution is attributable to the government or an 
agent that the government is incapable or unwilling to control.156 This last 
element is one of the biggest challenges SIJs face, and is one reason why 
SIJs may fail to qualify for asylum. SIJs do not face persecution by the 
government, but at the hands of their own parents. Although evading the 
government is not easy, it can be even harder to escape from one’s own 
parents, especially within one’s own country. It has been noted that 
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attempting to flee from a situation of domestic violence to a nearby 
relative’s or friend’s home is likely to be futile for a child, as the child is 
easily found by immediate family in those places.157 Although parents have 
the right to punish and discipline their children, international human rights 
norms prevent punishment that is cruel, inhuman, or degrading, rising to the 
level of persecution.158 Similarly, a parent may acquiesce to the child being 
abused by allowing physical or sexual abuse of the child by the parent’s 
partner.159 
The most likely scenario for qualifying a parent as an agent of harm is 
when the parent is routinely successful in evading governmental sanctions, 
or if state services turn a blind eye towards the abuse of an asylum-seeking 
child. The Ninth Circuit, in Aguirre-Cervantes, found that the government 
of Mexico was not willing to protect a child from domestic abuse due to its 
lack of recognition of domestic violence.160 One author notes, in speaking 
about principles deriving from the CRC, a child who fears persecution by 
abusive parents, as opposed to the government, may qualify for asylum.161 
Hence, a parent may also be an agent of harm. Aguirre-Cervantes is 
recognized as paving the way for a small group of eligible immigrant 
children who fall within the same fact pattern of domestic violence to 
qualify for asylum.162 
While unaccompanied child asylum-seekers are strikingly similar to SIJs, 
the latter are prevented from aging-out of status while the former are not. 
First, SIJs may often fit within the particular “social group” of belonging to 
an abuse-stricken family. Like the victim in Aguirre-Cervantes, SIJs have 
experienced some form of abuse, abandonment, or neglect at the hands of 
an abusive parent, thus fulfilling the persecution requirement. Moreover, it 
is highly unlikely that a child would run the risk of fleeing the familiarity 
and comfort of his or her own country in place of a reasonable alternative or 
if the child knew he or she could turn to and rely on the local government 
for help. Thus, it seems that SIJs meet the baseline requirements of an 
unaccompanied child asylum-seeker; nonetheless, child asylum-seekers are 
432 SEATTLE JOURNAL FOR SOCIAL JUSTICE 
STUDENT SCHOLARSHIP 
granted special help in the form of protection from aging-out. Given their 
similarities, it is absurd for Congress to draw distinctions between asylum-
seekers and SIJs by protecting asylum-seekers from aging-out, while 
allowing SIJs to age-out. 
F. The Convention on the Rights of the Child 
International jurisprudence on the rights of children greatly improved in 
the last twenty years. Created in 1989, the United Nations’s CRC is the first 
international convention to incorporate a full range of human rights for 
children—civil, cultural, economic, political, and social.163 The CRC was 
created to address the reality that children need a particular convention, 
because people under eighteen years of age often need special care and 
protection separate from that provided for adults.164 The drafters also 
advocated for the CRC to establish world recognition that children have 
human rights.165 Significantly, more countries have ratified the CRC than 
any other human rights treaty.166 Nevertheless, the U.S.—a world leader and 
advocate for human rights, and one of the five countries with a seat on the 
General Assembly of the United Nations—is one of only two countries to 
have signed but not ratified the treaty.167 The other, Somalia, lacks an 
internationally recognized government capable of executing ratification.168 
One of the central principles of the CRC is that there should be no delay 
in making decisions about children. Section 1(2) of the CRC states that “in 
any proceedings in which any question with respect to the upbringing of a 
child arises, the court shall have regard to the general principle that any 
delay in determining the question is likely to prejudice the welfare of the 
child.”169 This principle reflects the maxim that delay defeats justice, and 
that undue delay has heightened consequences for children and their 
development.170 Thus, the CRC maintains that children should be held in 
higher regard when it comes to determining their immigration status, and, 
moreover, that their petitions for aid should be granted priority and 
expedited review. 
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It is unacceptable for the U.S. not to be a signatory to the CRC. Because 
the U.S. has not ratified the treaty, it does not have to fully abide by its 
terms. Thus, the U.S. must take only minimal action in upholding the rights 
of children as defined by its own statutes and regulations. President Barack 
Obama has described the failure to ratify the CRC as “embarrassing” and 
has promised to review the U.S. decision.171 Those opposed to the 
ratification of the CRC argue that being a party to the CRC will open the 
door to outside interference from government and United Nations officials 
regarding the parents’ rights to raise a child as they see fit.172 Fortunately, it 
appears as though the movement for the U.S. to ratify the CRC is becoming 
stronger.173 
Hopefully, President Obama will refocus the U.S. position on the CRC 
and formally commit to upholding the Convention. Since treaties are 
supreme law, if the U.S. were to adopt the CRC there would be a much 
stronger argument for extending aging-out protections to SIJs.174 Given 
Section 1(2) of the CRC, eliminating the age-out provision would bring the 
SIJ statute into accordance with the treaty. Time regulations must be 
imposed on USCIS agents for reviewing SIJ applications, giving applicants 
closest to aging-out an expedited status, and a provision must be added to 
the SIJ statute to protect children from aging-out while their applications are 
pending. Even if the U.S. only ratified the treaty (as opposed to codifying 
it), it would still have to address cases involving children in a timely 
manner and prevent SIJs from aging-out.  
IV. THE SIJ’S RIGHT TO REPRESENTATION 
Currently, despite a complex and complicated immigration system, all 
U.S. immigrants, including child immigrants, have no legal right to 
representation. Legal representation for children is highly important—
children lack the experience and sophistication to understand the 
complexity of the law and the personal implications of applying for SIJ 
status or other forms of relief. The United Kingdom and Canada have state-
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funded representation to assist children with their asylum claims.175 SIJs 
actually fit within Canada’s definition of an unaccompanied child, as “those 
who are alone in Canada without their parents or anyone who purports to be 
a family member.”176 In Canada, unaccompanied children are warranted 
special procedural treatment throughout their refugee status 
determinations.177 These special accommodations include: ensuring the 
swift identification of unaccompanied children; appointing an officer to 
maintain responsibility for the child’s case throughout the entirety of the 
determination procedure; prioritizing these claims in order to process them 
as expeditiously as possible; and facilitating pre-hearing conferences to 
assess evidence the child is able to provide, including the best way to elicit 
this information.178 Further, the best interests of the child must be taken into 
account and reflected in the decision regarding the child’s status.179 
The U.S. has looked to Canada to help create procedures and standards 
for the adjudication of child asylum claims.180 The U.S. should follow 
Canada’s example by including SIJs in its definition of an unaccompanied 
child asylum-seeker and afford SIJs the same representation and procedural 
advantages as potential asylees, particularly by requiring that SIJ claims be 
processed expeditiously. From a simple appreciation of due process, SIJs 
should be granted the right to representation because they are children; even 
older adolescents may not have the requisite knowledge and capability to 
complete an application for SIJ status. Children and adolescents need extra 
guidance and help in dealing with legal matters, especially for such an 
important matter as that of legal citizenship status. As child asylum-seekers 
are very similar to SIJs, SIJs should be afforded the same type of protection 
in the U.S. Like Canada, the U.S. should afford potential SIJs the right to 
counsel as they go through the lengthy and difficult application process, 
especially given the timeliness and urgency such applications currently 
require due to the threat of aging-out. 
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V. RECOMMENDATIONS 
To remedy the problem of deserving SIJs aging-out, first and foremost, 
the SIJ provision of the INA needs to be amended to prevent this 
occurrence. If the INA explicitly stated that SIJs could not age-out of status 
once a valid and qualified application were submitted, then the BIA would 
not be allowed to apply its own interpretation of the SIJ statute. For 
example, a provision could be added stating that as long as the application 
is filed before the child has reached the age of majority or aged-out of the 
foster care system, the child will not age-out of SIJ status. This way, the 
child’s age would toll from the time the application is submitted. Thus, the 
holding of Perez-Olano would be reversed, and the application procedure 
would better reflect the main purpose of the SIJ program—to protect abused 
and vulnerable immigrant youths. Secondly, when a child comes into foster 
care, like in Canada, an officer or agent should be appointed to the child. 
This officer would be responsible for checking the child’s legal status and 
flagging a child for SIJ eligibility if the child’s situation warranted such 
status. 
With or without a legislative revision of the INA statute, the U.S. 
Supreme Court should take the first available opportunity to revisit the issue 
of SIJs aging-out and reverse its ruling in Perez-Olano. The Court should 
recognize that the SIJ program’s emphasis is on protecting abused and 
vulnerable immigrant youths regardless of their age of majority, and thus 
overrule the BIA’s interpretation of the statute as unreasonable. It is not a 
reasonable interpretation of the statute to allow SIJs to age-out when their 
applications are still pending and they applied as minor children. The very 
thing that makes SIJs’ status “special” is their vulnerability, due to the 
threat of living in a society where they have no legal status and are forced to 
live without any of that society’s benefits and without a support network of 
family and friends. Allowing SIJs to age-out leads to the opposite outcome: 
harming SIJs and making their future harder than warranted. 
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Furthermore, special regulations should be set in place to ensure that 
USCIS and other immigration officers expedite and pay particular attention 
to SIJ applications, especially when those children are on the verge of 
aging-out. Immigration officers should be required to expedite those 
immigration applications which need immediate attention due to application 
deadlines. The U.S. should place these mandatory expedition requirements 
upon immigration officials, following the principle of “no delay” set forth 
by the CRC. Requiring immigration officials to prioritize SIJ applications 
would comport with one of the main principles of the CRC. Currently, 
ICE’s primary responsibility is to enforce immigration regulations within 
the U.S.181 Given this purpose, many immigration agents focus on 
deportation.182 Discretion as to the timing of an SIJ’s application should not 
be left in the hands of an agency whose inclination is to deport immigrants. 
Immigration authorities are not primarily focused on the well-being of SIJs 
and the implications of illegal status on a young immigrant’s life. Therefore, 
immigration processors should be required to expedite an SIJ’s application. 
Without such a mandate, there is little hope that an agent will exercise the 
expediency to push such an application through as soon as they possibly 
can. It is absolutely shameful for the U.S. to be one of the two countries out 
of 140 to have signed the CRC, but have not ratified it.183 The U.S. needs to 
promptly reexamine its position on the CRC. Once it does, Congress should 
reformulate its position on SIJs’ ability to age-out and should conform to 
the principle of “no delay” in processing a child’s application. 
Furthermore, the U.S. should treat SIJs like unaccompanied asylum-
seekers. After the decision in Aguirre-Cervantes, SIJs and asylum-seekers 
are similar in position. First, SIJs fall within the definition of 
unaccompanied minors as held by both the U.S. and the UNHCR.184 
Further, as exemplified by Aguirre-Cervantes, there is a movement towards 
perceiving children who are victims of domestic violence as eligible for 
asylum.185 These child asylum-seekers can show that they face persecution 
by their parents and fall within a particular social group of being a member 
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of a family suffering from abuse by a family member. As child asylum-
seekers are not allowed to age-out, their similar counterparts, SIJs, should 
be allotted the same protection. 
Finally, Congress should eliminate an SIJ’s ability to age-out due to the 
obstacles that these children face after aging-out of foster care and, 
therefore, SIJ eligibility. The fact that most children who age-out of foster 
care, even with status, find themselves struggling without jobs, living with 
an increased rate of incarceration, or even living homeless shows that SIJs 
should at least be afforded an equal playing field by giving them a chance to 
receive legal citizenship status. Without such status, SIJs have even less 
chance of bettering their lives, as they lack the ability to receive public 
benefits and are forced to live in the underground world of undocumented 
immigrants. These youths deserve an opportunity to better their lives after 
being abandoned, abused, and neglected by their own parents. These youths 
need to be given a fair chance at earning status by not allowing them to age-
out after going through all the procedural steps to get such status. Going one 
step further, Congress could follow Canada’s example by providing these 
children with special procedural advantages and a right to legal 
representation. 
VI. CONCLUSION 
Congress passed the Special Immigrant Juvenile statute to provide a 
special group of immigrant children a means to create better lives for 
themselves and to protect these children from prior lives shadowed by 
abuse, abandonment, and neglect. However, SIJs are not protected when 
they are allowed to age-out of eligibility. Congress and the international 
community have recognized on numerous fronts that children deserve 
special protection, expedited procedures, and extra attention. Congress must 
give these children the special protection and opportunity that they deserve 
to succeed in life, especially after having suffered a life of abuse. The 
ability of SIJs to age-out must end. 
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